

Transrational Peaces Extended to Economics
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Transrationality gave me the words to express what I already felt in my heart and gave those words an epistemological backing so that I knew that when I quoth them forth into the world, that I could also stand behind them. My introduction to transrational approaches thus marks a personal turning point from vague intuitive notions residing on the cusp of the ineffable, to a philosophical orientation that integrates the nuances of modern life. In giving me the words, it is the ability to clearly describe the limits of my language, and in Wittgenstein's formulation, the limits of my world (Wittgenstein 1989), which is to be able to walk up to that cusp of the ineffable, touch it, and to know that what lies beyond cannot be expressed in prose. I believe that my heart was always oriented to transrational approaches and now I have a language that can express them.

What I found revolutionary about Wolfgang Dietrich's transrationality was that it was a reiteration of what I consider a perennial concept — a nuanced, holistic, and integral framework for interpreting the world. There are historical precedents to transrationality from around the world; I have personally been influenced by the medicine wheel, adapted from Lakota traditions, as a holistic approach combining mental, emotional, physical, and spiritual aspects of the human experience (Hart 2002). Dietrich was himself inspired by the teachings of Tantra Yoga, and draws the intrapersonal layers of the conflict pyramid from the Sutras of Patanjali (Dietrich 2014). I would assert that most people have an intuitive sense that energetic understandings underpin macrostructures, yet defer to the rational instrumentality. In the English language, peace often refers to harmony and tranquility in daily parlance even if, when questioned, people define peace as security or a contract between warring parties. It is as if the internal and external are completely separate. Wisdom traditions based on the yoga sutras or the medicine wheel may find resonance amongst counter-culture crowds where they are useful tools of intrapersonal analysis, however, there is a tacit assumption that they cannot be applied on the social level, and are thus dismissed as naive and fanciful musings of a utopian fringe. Dietrich's

work has given legitimacy to the assertion that energetic and modern perspectives can inform each other and transrationality can stand up to scrutiny in the face of scientific positivism.

I was first introduced to this way of viewing the world, transrational approaches, through the academic discipline of peace studies in 2007. I found myself a master's student in an enthusiastic group of peers who seemed to be taking these new ideas and running with them, exploring their contours and their paradoxes. My friends and colleagues were exploring transrational approaches to law, to education, to immigration, to mysticism and conflict transformation: it was an inspiring and liberating moment surrounded by stimulating souls. Since I had just graduated from an MA program in 2008, directly into a global financial crisis and into the worst job market in a generation, the *Zeitgeist* seemed to be compelling me to explore a transrational approach to economics. It appeared to me as an appropriate way to explore transrationality and as a way of directing my creative energies towards an emergent question of our times.

Transrational approaches to economics integrate energetic principles into what is a predominantly modern concept of economics. From investigating the multiplicitous understandings of peace across time and from around the world, Wolfgang Dietrich found that definitions of peace tended to fall into predictable semantic categories: harmony, justice, security, and truth (Dietrich 2012). Those four different flavours of peace were the inspiration for the families of peaces: energetic, moral, modern, and postmodern (Dietrich 2012). When looking at these quadrants, the energetic quadrant is the one that is clearly incompatible with the assumptions of mainstream economics. Moral approaches can be exemplified by the Islamic trading of the Caliphate; modern approaches can be defined as the time of mercantilist empires, through Adam Smith until the mid to late twentieth century; postmodern approaches are characterized by everything that seeks to subvert the singular power of the nation-state either by supranational means or interpersonal relations: transrational approaches integrate all quadrants. Since one is left out of the general associations, the single biggest cognitive step is integrating an energetic conception into the moral, modern, and postmodern families.

This has already been done. Charles Eisenstein's book *Sacred Economics* (2011) advocates precisely this idea. His premise is that the sacredness of the gift has been lost from modern conceptions of money. Energetic understandings of what we might call economics manifest themselves in gifts. We give from ourselves because we recognize ourselves in others; the divine in me sees the divine in you. In an energetic understanding, gifts are reciprocated, which can be seen as the functioning of an economy, not because of normative obligations, but rather inspired by gratitude. Gifts, in this understanding are always given without expectation of a return, which echoes moral precepts that the only true charity is anonymous because it incurs no debt.

Although I drew a lot of inspiration from Eisenstein's work, I found there was still ample room to add to his ideas. While Eisenstein does a good job in outlining the justification for his sacred economics, making the case as to why energetic principles should be re-introduced to economic thought, it does seem to privilege the gift as a pure form of interaction. What a transrational approach provides is a framework through which to view the different aspects of how our economic necessities manifest. In this sense, the gift is but one of a plethora of modes of human relationships. The quadrants of transrational peaces thus help to orient debate and discussion.

I heard a debate on the radio in 2015 about economics and predatory lending. There were three guests: one argued that predatory lending should be banned outright; one argued that what was needed was more government oversight and better regulation; the third ceded that perhaps a review of the rules was a good idea but largely argued that this was the way of the free-market and we just needed to accept it. I quickly realized that these three guests, at least in the moment that I caught them, were representing moral, modern, and postmodern interpretations of economics. They were ostensibly debating the same thing, economic policy, but seen from the perspective of the families of peaces, each one was arguing from a different base set of assumptions. Winning the debate in the zero-sum sense of making the more convincing argument or changing the mind of one of the debaters is thus highly improbable, if not impossible. The framework of transrational peaces offers an explanation of how they

relate to each other.

I will elaborate in a brief form some of the characteristics of economics from the perspective of each of the four constituent families of peaces, which is but a summary of previous research for my doctoral dissertation in which the concepts are explored in greater detail (Bryant 2016). There are no pure examples of any of the following interpretations of economics: they are always blended with other perspectives. From a transrational perspective, all four are always present. What we see in historical and cultural examples that can be labelled as one family or the other are cases in which one quadrant is dominant. We can also see salient example of one family within the paradigm of another, for instance, a moral aspect within a predominantly modern paradigm. The summary is that the categories are impure and they are mostly useful inasmuch as they can illuminate what aspects of transrational peaces are being emphasized or obscured.

Postmodern Economics

I will begin with the postmodern family, which will be characterized by the erosion of the hegemony of the nation-state, disillusionment with the vector of progress, and symbolic money. It is a tenet of modern economics that the nation-state is the only legitimate actor on the world stage. In postmodern approaches to economics, we see this privileged position of the nation-state eroded from above and from below. On the supranational level, various multilateral organizations, conventions, and treaties limit the sovereignty of nation-states, but more importantly reduce the scope of policy interventions that nation-states have at their disposal to manage their domestic economies. This is a key argument against the globalizing effect of free-trade agreements. The grass-roots anti-globalization protest movements are in fact an example of the erosion from below. At the same time as there is an increase in the apparatuses resembling global governance, there has also been a romanticization of the vernacular, an increase in small-scale and local economic endeavours, such as community-supported agriculture, local markets, and local adjunct currencies. This ambivalence, sometimes referred to by the neologism *glocalization* (see e.g. Robertson 1994 or Bauman 1998), means that on the macro-level,

nation-states have fewer levers to pull to adjust the political economy of the country, and on the micro-level, people are creating their own local solutions that offer a postmodern twist of the logic of the nation-state.

Parallel to the glocalization effect, the doubt of the postmodern condition calls the foundation of economic institutions into question. The use of GDP, or rather the rate of change of the GDP, as the universal measurement of wealth, prosperity, and human well-being has fallen under criticism from postmodern perspectives. Despite its elegant simplicity in solving the age-old problem of how to compare unlike objects, such as apples and oranges, by comparing them to a third objective standard of value grounded in the epistemological certainty of numbers, there are three main critiques of GDP: it fails to account for non-market services, it includes destructive activities, and it fails to account for the future prospects of asset bases (Stiglitz, Sen & Fitoussi 2008). The logic of this perspective, rational application to the postmodern condition, thus leads to proposals to amend GDP with ever more detailed variables. Consequently, we get proposed solutions such as accounting for all possible “ecosystem services” and assigning them a numerical value (Costanza et al. 1997). It inevitably returns to the essential critique put forth in *Limits to Growth* (Meadows et al. 1972) that the perpetual growth of GDP is fundamentally unsustainable.

Postmodern perspectives are generally united in their critique of the vector of progress pointing in the wrong direction. This critique began with the early environmental movement arguing that expansion of an industrialized economy would increase environmental degradation and would thus be leading away from, rather than towards, a utopian dream. It was further extended beyond the horizons of environmentalism to include all teleological processes with the emergence of post-development critique. This of course included the notion of economic development, based on the assumption that all parts of the world needed to follow the singular prescribed path from an inferior and impoverished past to a prosperous future amongst the countries with advanced industrialized economies. As a consequence of the rejection of linear processes, postmodern perspectives favour an understanding of

non-linear unfoldings that create innumerable manifestations of the human experience.

The kind of money that is representative of postmodern interpretations is a sign that stands in for a sign. I have used moral interpretations to explain the understanding of money as a physical object such as gold, since there are many contexts, both historical and contemporary, in which gold and money are indistinguishably the same thing. In this case of looking at the postmodern family, a paper bill or digital accounts no longer represent some bullion in a vault; they can be redeemed only for an exact copy of themselves. Postmodern money has thus become a symbol without any physical referent other than itself: it is lost in an iterative hall of mirrors. This may make it sound like these interpretations of money have no basis in value, and while it is true that it is not possible to find a singular solid foundation to the value of money in this way, it does open up the possibility of finding agreements as to what is valuable in our concrete relationships with other people. If it is all a hall of mirrors, then I have some choice as to the stories I imbue my money with.

Modern Economics

By following the definition of modernity that Wolfgang Dietrich uses, that of modernity as a state of mind, it is influenced by the Hobbesian nation-state, Cartesian reductionism, and Newtonian mechanism (Dietrich 2012). These three philosophical grandfathers bring us the nation-state as the legitimate arbiter of the economy, individual material justice as its goal, and the epistemological certainty of scientific positivism as its means. The nation-state creates and actively maintains a separate sphere of human activity that can be identified as the economy, which is an aggregate indicator for the well-being of its inhabitants. Growth and development supported by the vectoral chronoscopy of modernity are necessary to drive the progress towards the future goal of peace and well-being which is ensured by the justice of satisfying our mundane needs. The application of rational thought is thus the method of designing and creating the political apparatus of the nation-state that will guarantee the peace and material economic justice for all of its citizens.

There is a simple elegance to purely modern perspectives that I can greatly appreciate. I can

imagine that everything would be work out alright if everyone had enough money. We could all buy the things we need, and not owe anything to anybody. There could be clean and conflict-free interactions of private and discreet individuals who function within clearly established rules that keep everybody safe. We would just need to grow the economy at any cost to make sure that everybody would have jobs and access to money to be able to participate in this orderly civilization. People would have the means to look after themselves and could be perfectly independent. There is a distinct beauty in the libertarian trust in people and a faith for the market to provide.

Capitalism may be, by the estimation of Milton Friedman, the system by which greed does the least harm, but it is also a system by which greed is elevated from one the seven deadly sins to the essence of objective reality. Assuming rational self-interest is considered scientific, whereas assuming that humans are embedded in a complex web of symbolic relationships and will act in accordance with their place in those interwoven strands is considered unrealistic. To truly integrate and subsume all the cultures of the world to participate in a singular global economy goes far beyond a rational choice in favour of efficiency and marginal utility. It requires turning away from the energetic voices, the spiritual dimensions, on which many cultural interpretations of peace are based. The reason every nation-state is not like Denmark is simply because the cost of the total annihilation and restructuring of society is just too high.

Moral Economics

As a basis of moral interpretations, I use the concept of the great chain of being. It is a grand hierarchy of all things with God and other angelic beings at the top, plants and animals in the middle, and minerals at the bottom. Thomas Aquinas elaborated this theory in Christian doctrine, but the idea was present long before his time and can be found in the works of Aristotle (Lovejoy 1936). This establishes the theory that there are fundamentally different kinds of beings, and therefore different kinds of people that will never be equal. They are therefore best governed under a hierarchy.

Moral approaches to economics have a conception of time that breaks away from the cyclical

understandings of energetic peaces. This introduces a linear conception of time in which peace is not experienced in the present moment, rather is projected into some point in the future. In this way, life is not seen as a gift, but is rather conceptualized as a debt; a debt is an obligation that can only be absolved in the future. The logic of debt has two key functions in this moral worldview. Firstly, it reinforces the divine hierarchy of the great chain of being. Secondly, for those who would perceive themselves as equals, it creates a hierarchy between them. The moral norm of the prohibition of usury is introduced as a countervailing factor against the inherent violence of unadulterated hierarchy.

Moral economics can further be seen as an extension of mutual aid. This is especially true in an Islamic context under the Abbasid Caliphate. Although there is nothing wrong with the honest pursuit of profit under Islam, the pursuit of profit as an end in itself would seem as strange to a mediaeval ethicist as would its absence to a modern economist. It is because commerce was seen as an extension of mutual aid, as part of dissimilar people playing their roles in the divine hierarchy. “Muslim ethicists did often enjoin merchants to drive a hard bargain with the rich” asserts David Graeber, “so they could charge less, or pay more, when dealing with the less fortunate” (Graeber 2011:280). It may resemble the taxation system of a welfare state, and yet it is based not on equality before the law, but precisely on our differences and inequalities within a larger context of community.

Energetic Approaches

The energetic family of peaces manifests in such a way that I hesitate to even use the word economics to describe it. The analysis of energetic paradigms and gift economies builds on the pioneering work of Marcel Mauss on gift exchange (Mauss 1925). Where my understanding differs from Mauss’ analysis of gift exchange is that what is reciprocated is not the physical object of the gift at all; what is reciprocated is the act of giving. In this way we can find examples of people meeting and exchanging like substances (such as exchanging betel nut or similar amounts of taro (Graeber 2001, 70)). There is no competitive advantage in these same-for-same exchanges. It might seem redundant unless we understand the energetic principle of reciprocating the act of giving in order to recreate and

solidify the relationship between the two people.

That is what it is really all about in energetic understandings: relationships. In fact, we do not see money in energetic perspectives in the way we might expect coming from modern assumptions. We may find all kinds of items used as a medium of exchange (e.g. whale teeth, beads, large stones, cloth, brass rods), but rather than being used to buy the daily necessities of life (a dozen eggs, a pound of potatoes, a cake of soap) they are used to re-organize human relationships. They are used to arrange weddings, to settle a blood debt, or to affirm a social rank. Their exchange then is not oriented to the creation of profit in order to pay off a landlord, pay a heating bill, and put food on the table. These kinds of “human economies,” to use Graeber’s term (Graeber 2011), are weaving and recreating the very tapestry of society.

There is a persistent myth that people were starving in abject poverty before the industrial revolution. The cotton gin came along and now we have technology and progress and finally we can feed ourselves. The truth is that throughout history, people only spent a marginal amount of their time on subsistence activities. The rest of the time was spent on activities that we might call culture, child-rearing, preparing ceremonies, spiritual practice, all of which are enacting and recreating society. There are countless examples of stateless and non-market societies throughout history and around the world. In fact what modernity considers the norm, the liberalized market economy of the late twentieth century, is rather the historical aberration. This discourse seems so internalized that it is a cognitive barrier to imagining anything else. Gift exchange and sacred economics can easily make sense amongst friends, on the small scale, but are often seen as impractical for our modern technological society, which is an anathema to the discourse of technology itself, which is supposed to increase our options, not decrease them. There seems to be a disjuncture between what is possibly relationally on the interpersonal level and on the societal level. To use a Hindu metaphor, Shiva is the lord of macro-economics and Shakti cannot join him there. What makes transrational perspectives interesting is that it offers a bridge across this cognitive gulf where Shiva and Shakti can, as they are wont to do, reunite.

Transrational Perspectives

Transrational perspectives attempt to take the best from each of the other four families of peaces, while mitigating their shadow sides. This is done with a mind that is not searching for a final truth, but is pliable, dynamic, relational, and contingent on the context. Energetic expressions offer an appreciation of interconnectedness, an immanent divine, and life as a gift for all to share. Moral perspectives offer the sacredness of human life; precepts and norms are constructed in order to help safeguard that sanctity. A moral norm like the prohibition of usury is to protect the delicate balance of human life. Modernity offers the logic of structure and order, which helps with the efficient use of resources and of our time and efforts. Postmodern perspectives offer respect for plurality and diversity, which implies openness to different kinds of economies and different ways of knowing. A dynamic synthesis, in the sense of a constantly shifting and pulsating equilibrium, is what transrational approaches to economics are.

I will give some examples of how some concepts are inflected in each of the families of peaces and what their transrational synthesis might look like. Starting with charity, in moral perspectives, people give to charity because it is the will of God to maintain the structures of society and it ensures one's passage into Heaven. Modern perspectives might continue the practice of giving to charity, even through the institution of religion, however it is rather seen as contributing to the common good or doing one's duty as an individual citizen. The charity, whether it be a church or an NGO, is primarily judged on its efficiency in redistributing resources. Energetic perspectives give gifts of charity because it feels good and to honour the relationship with the recipient, rather than out of an instilled sense of duty or as tribute. Postmodern perspectives see charity as little more than buying symbolic peace of mind in order to assuage one's own guilt. In transrational perspectives all of these reasons are valid and none of them are binding. From a transrational viewpoint, the best case is an action that fulfils as many of them at once as possible, which might mean an act of charity that has an established cultural tradition (moral), is directed at those in need (modern), elicits feelings of genuine satisfaction

(energetic), and builds compassionate solidarity (postmodern).

Currency is another example that we can use to further explain transrational approaches. What looking at economics through the lens of the families of peaces can show is that the physical form of money is rather irrelevant; moreover, whether money is defined by bullion or by credit relationships is also secondary. What they have in common is that they are conventions that are agreed upon. Money as a unit of account is a measurement of our trust in other humans. However, this does bring us into problems because trust is not linear since people are not one-dimensional; I might trust an acquaintance to pay his bills, but still not look after my children. The moral family offers a concept that can be useful here: spheres of exchange. Outside of the free-market where everything, except for maybe a full human being, is for sale for the right price, spheres of exchange describe situations in which some items are freely exchanged and yet there are no direct equivalencies between the spheres. In the famous example of the Mae-Enga people: one can trade stone axes for pearl-shell pendants and pigs for cassowary birds, but no amount of axes will ever equal a cassowary bird (Gregory 1982).

The concept of spheres of exchange provides a way to integrate some aspects of moral and modern approaches to economics. From the moral perspective, there is an aspect of the divine hierarchy by which there are people and things of distinct quality which should be kept separate in order to preserve the natural order of things. One sphere of exchange can be, as Eisenstein (2011) suggests, a rationalized sphere in which industrialized and generic goods can be exchanged with a universal currency, which is the preservation yet containment of the principles of modern economics. My spiritual teacher, J. C. Lucas¹, who combines his Hesquiaht heritage, Lakota traditions, and Baha'i faith, often makes herbal medicines; his one instruction to me has been never to sell them: they must be given away. One aspect of this teaching is to safeguard that the sick and vulnerable would not be denied their medicine because of a shortage of cash on hand, but more importantly to me, it is a precept

¹ John Christian Lucas, born 1944 in Hesquiaht, a remote community on the west coast of Vancouver Island, Canada, has been a teacher, mentor, and above all, a friend in the two decades I have known him. He lives a life of service adapting spiritual practice toward the healing of trauma and addictions. As the years go by, I appreciate more the profound impact he has had on me and I have come to see my career in peace studies as intimately intertwined with his teachings.

to keep the medicine in the sacred sphere. It operates under the premise of the gift, the premise of energetic approaches, and is thus quite literally an example of Eisenstein's sacred economics. What the postmodern dimension adds is the aspect of radical plurality: there is an infinite number of spheres of exchange. We can never know, enumerate, and categorize all of them because they are as bountiful as human experiences. However, we can establish congruent spheres of exchange in our fluctuating concrete relationships in the present moment. All things considered, this is not a bad prospect.

Returning for a moment to the idea of money as a socially agreed convention, there is an important caveat. If we follow postmodern and transrational perspectives then it can be easily seen that money is nothing more than an arbitrary agreement between people. I am willing to accept money in exchange for my time, my labour, or my possessions because I trust that other people around me will also accept that money for the same things. Within a modern paradigm, I can easily have that trust because there is an elaborate system of rules, operated by the state, that enforces the acceptance of the national currency backed up by the threat of violence. It might seem like a great idea to start acting like money is just an arbitrary agreement, until you come up against the rules of the state. If I drive off in a new car claiming that I promise to do some renovations on the salesman's house (which, in the end, the money is no more than a transferable promise for *something* that the car salesman wants), how far might I get before the violence of the state became blisteringly real? I would likely be arrested and thrown in jail, and if I flat out refused to leave the vehicle, I would probably be forcefully removed. There are two points that this example is making. Firstly, these ideas should not be taken as some kind of anarchist's cookbook on how to usurp the nation-state; the logic of violence is pervasive and strong and the point of transrationality is not to provoke the system — it is to transcend it. Secondly, the point is liberation from mental structure, not just breaking the rules. Simply defying the norms of society is not an expression of transrationality. If there are two people who are both open to living in a transrational way, maybe we can negotiate the new kitchen cupboards for the car. One person alone can still experience a total philosophical reorientation towards economics and choose to interact with

society and the market in a transrational way. However, it is a deeper shift than obstinately and unilaterally declaring that the rules no longer apply.

The final concept that I will use to elaborate transrational approaches to economics is justice. Justice is a polemical concept within the theory of the families of peaces because it generally posits a linear understanding of time which projects peace into the future. Peace in this sense becomes a product of justice that is yet to come. This way of thinking is always oriented to a temporal understanding that is *not now* and thus peace cannot be experienced in the present moment. An energetic interpretation of economic justice could be understood by Graeber's term "baseline communism" (Graeber 2011). He means that all societies function on an initial premise, what I might call an energetic principle, that people give from their own abilities to the needs of others. Smokers know all about this camaraderie when looking for a light or being the only one with matches; anyone who has jumped into the water to save a drowning child knows that they did not think about themselves, let alone, what is in it for me? It is a faith that others will treat you with the same human decency yet expecting nothing. By contrast, moral perspectives posit a teleological justice that comes in heaven after our time on the earthly plane is over. A modern interpretation is that of material justice on Earth, which comes with economic development, a product of human reason. Postmodern interpretations of justice deny the existence of any kind of absolute justice and claim that we only ever get the justice of our localized relationships.

Transrational interpretations of justice will include aspects of all of these interpretations. We may have an experience of baseline communism from friends and family, which is to say where our relationships are strongest. If a friend buys me dinner or does me a favour, I usually do not worry too much about paying him back immediately because I know that in an on-going relationship there will always be another opportunity to meet an arising need. By the same token, however, we can only extend the baseline communism if we have strong relationships. A characteristic of the nation-state can be found in this assertion, which is both a strength and a weakness: it attempts to extend this

brotherhood of citizenship to everyone in a given territory without the underlying relationship. Granted, anyone who has lived outside of the land of their youth has probably experienced the elation of meeting a compatriot, speaking the mother tongue again, talking about familiar sports and cultural touchstones that no one else could appreciate, but this is exactly how the logic of the nation-state functions well. It creates a discourse of common experience that can be shared across geographical distance. It creates proclivities to establishing strong relationships between people who are by any other account complete strangers. The difference that transrational approaches bring is, whereas Marxists called for the workers of the world to unite based on their shared material needs, that is by no means the only aspect of the human experience that we have in common. We can also have a shared human experience of the divine which thus increases our proclivities to create strong bonds with complete strangers, not just national compatriots.

From a moral interpretation of justice, we can take an orientation towards the future. A transrational inflection of this moral orientation is rooting it in the present moment. As moral versions of justice are understood as a divine justice in the afterlife, earthly actions intended to create justice are inevitably oriented towards the future. From a transrational perspective, I would argue that there is nothing inherently wrong with planning for the future, it is living in the future, constantly operating from only one orientation, that is an expression of imbalance. It is both natural and prudent to imagine and plan for a step or two ahead of one's present action, however, it should be clear that obstinately clinging to that vision in the face of changing circumstances is foolhardy, if not dangerous. Thus a grounding in the present moment, a receptivity to the fluctuating nuances of life, allows a transrational subject to plan for justice as a redress of grievances in the future, without losing touch with present possibilities or getting lost in castles in the sky.

Transrational interpretations of justice logically include aspects of rationality. Modern approaches of material justice emphasize satisfaction of our material needs. Where this gets out of hand is when human needs are seen as infinite. It is thus a role of transrational approaches to temper the

practical application of material needs with the contentedness of the Bodhisattva. Transrational interpretations of material justice acknowledge that there are basic needs that must be met and that it should be done efficiently and with adequate buffers for resilience, and yet beyond such thresholds, the concepts of economic growth or economic development make little sense. In this way, transrational approaches echo Ernst Friedrich Schumacher's concept of Buddhist Economics (Schumacher 1973). They can integrate material satisfaction and resilience without it being an end in itself.

Within this discussion of transrational justice lies the fundamental question of the schism between internal and external experiences of economics. Studies of subjective well-being generally show that there is a satiation point beyond which an increase in per capita income has minimal impact on increasing life satisfaction (Easterlin 1974). However, there is also a phenomenon known as the hedonic treadmill (Brickman & Campbell 1971), which means that an increase in living standards eventually becomes a new normal, a new baseline. The pathology of modernity is that it offers no way of getting off of the hedonic treadmill. The difference with transrationality is that it is possible to make such changes and step off the metaphorical treadmill. The fallacy of the treadmill is embedded in the English language in adages such as money cannot buy happiness, it is better to give than to receive, the best things in life are free, and yet these perennial words of wisdom are surprisingly difficult to live by. They reflect a mode of being that is beyond the rational, and it is this step beyond, the *trans* in the transrational, that is not so easy. This question of transrational interpretations of justice comes down to a question of human happiness, which has been the subject of religions, philosophy, and wisdom traditions for the duration of known human history.

The next logical question is how is this done. The simple response is that the answer lies in the name of the philosophy being presented: it is to step beyond the isolating rationality of our own minds. There is no precise formula to accomplish this, however, there are many traditions that embrace an opening to a human experience beyond the Self. Such an experience, a transpersonal experience, could be known as experiencing the grace of God, as deep meditation, or as a shamanic experience, however

the common thread is experiencing oneself no longer as an isolated individual, but as an interconnected part of a greater whole. This discussion gets into the realm of elicitive methods of conflict transformation, which is another topic, yet it should be clear that it is a logical extension of the questions raised from a transrational enquiry into economics.

It is an area of interest to further investigate which elicitive methods might be best suited to deconstructing attitudes towards economics. The question is which methods of elicitive conflict transformation can help folk get off the hedonic treadmill and build trust in relationships. In the first respect, it should be a method oriented to experiencing desire as a recurring creative life force rather than as a linear process that requires satisfaction, climax, in order to be resolved. For the second part, the trust in relationships, it is easy to imagine that it only takes one selfish person to ruin the commons for everyone. This is the kind of behaviour that norms are trying to prevent and human beings have the built-in mechanism of shame to enforce social norms. However, again it comes back to the basis of strong relationships: without empathy from the collective to temper the shaming, and without attachment from the shamed to want to rejoin the collective, there is no possibility to rebuild a healthy constellation. Shame without empathy villainizes the shamed and people without healthy attachment relationships have nothing to live for, which is the starting point of sociopathic behaviour that incites people to transgress social norms in the first place. Said in this way, this line of enquiry into the basis of transrational approaches to economics seems neither novel nor revolutionary as it is only stating the basic premises of conviviality, however, as so many human beings live in large, anonymous urban settings with access to a vast and largely anonymous public forum known as the Internet, something as simple as developing strong relationships is a deceptively important issue.

I have a friend who is always eager to offer a helping hand but seldom follows through. It is an appropriate example for extending relational dynamics to economics because it is like he is writing a bunch of cheques that always bounce. I can take his promise to help at face value, assuming that his intention is genuine, but when it comes time to call in the favour, the currency proves to be worthless.

This is the kind of situation that metallic currencies are intended to prevent and that credit currencies have the tendency to fall into: there is nothing to prevent him from making all kinds of promises that he cannot keep. The promises may be made in sincerity and yet add up beyond the practical capacity of one man to fulfill. Eventually my friend's reputation catches up with him, at least as far as I am concerned, because I no longer depend on him even if he offers support; he bounced a few too many cheques with me so I am less likely to accept his currency. There are two key points here, which attempt to wrap up this discussion. First, transrational approaches require a method to mitigate this problematic aspect of relationally-based economics. In my case the relationship solves the problem because his credit rating drops until he makes amends, changes his behaviour, or both. Yet the question remains of what is the best way to create a safe space for the necessary personal transformation to occur, without getting lost in feelings of shame, rejection, abandonment or any of our other collective human fears? I imagine that the answers to these questions are as diverse as the people they are meant to help, yet it is the next question that the enquiry of transrational approaches to economics asks.

Concluding remarks

The single biggest factor that is needed for a transrational shift is an appreciation of the eternal. Transrational approaches are by their nature non-prescriptive, yet using the method of Elicitive Conflict Mapping that is derived from a transrational perspective, one can ask what is needed and what is out of balance. In terms of the current state of economics, capitalism cannot exist without the spectre of its own demise, which is one of Graeber's conclusions (Graeber 2011). Longterm perspective is needed because free-market capitalism over-emphasizes the short term gain. Capitalism needs a vectoral chronoscopy with a terminus, otherwise, things could be leveraged infinitely into the future, just as we saw in the example of my friend making promises he could not keep. Capitalism requires its antithesis to survive, whether they be Marxist revolutionaries or the Cold War, a pending peasant revolt or climate change, the imagined end of days is required to keep the collective perspective myopic. This is of course not to say that something like climate change is not a real threat, just that it exists within a

discourse with capitalism in which it serves an additional discursive role of recreating a linear timeline. I therefore advocate the long present, a long term perspective, as a necessary shift towards transrational understandings of economics. This may appear to differ from Dietrich's approach of the here-and-now, by which all conflict transformation happens in the present moment (Dietrich 2013), however, I do not disagree with Dietrich's premise because from the perspective of the conflict mapping, the long-term perspective is just where the current imbalance is lacking and this does not preclude an awareness of the present moment. From a transrational perspective, our lives are not our own; we are part of a multigenerational cycle of existence. In an Iroquois village, one half buries the dead of the other half; if there is always a village, then there is no need to keep track (Graeber 2011:99-100). This is where the assumption of eternity contrasts with the vectoral chronosphy of modern economics and usurps the concept of debt. Transrational approaches must hold simultaneously a view of eternity with the present moment.

Using Dietrich's theory of the five families of peaces to interpret economics offers two unique contributions. Firstly, it includes an energetic perspective. This is a small yet radical shift because most analyses begin from a moral perspective. It is my assertion that the inclusion of energetic perspectives on economics allows for a transrational shift. Secondly, the framework of transrational peaces provides a structure from which to view and understand the apparent contradictions of the different families. I often wondered how so-called Western civilization could be so clearly based on Judeo-Christian values and yet reject the prohibition of usury, which is one of its tenets. By viewing them as moral and modern interpretations of economics, it shifts the contradiction from dilemma to complementary aspects of a larger and vastly more complex whole. Rather than arguing if the physiocrats, the metallists, or the Keynesians are the ones who hold the one truth, we can view them as discursive products of their own ontologies.

In the final count, the summary of transrational approaches to economics may seem unsatisfactory in the face of contemporary issues. Climate change still threatens to melt the polar ice

caps and raise the levels of the oceans, landfills are stilling filling up with plastic waste, and the working classes are still oppressed by the bourgeoisie. Yet, as unsatisfying as it might sound in the light of very real problems, solutions are not what transrational approaches provide. What it does offer, however, is a shift in perspective through which the options change. What is real, what is possible, and what is imaginable become vastly different. And once again, in that case, the prospects for peace are not that bad.

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